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Abstract— In this paper we present matrix game-theoretic models for joint routing, network coding, and 
scheduling problem. First routing and network coding are modeled by using a new approach based on 
compressed topology matrix that takes into account the inherent multicast gain of the network. The 
scheduling is optimized by a new approach called network graph soft coloring. Soft graph coloring is 
designed by switching between different components of a wireless network graph, which we refer to as 
graph fractals,   with appropriate usage rates. The network components, represented by graph fractals, are 
a new paradigm in network graph partitioning that enables modeling of the network optimization problem 
by using the matrix game framework. In the proposed game which is a nonlinear cubic game, the strategy 
sets of the players are links, path, and network components. The outputs of this game model are mixed 
strategy vectors of the second and the third players at equilibrium. Strategy vector of the second player 
specifies optimum multi-path routing and network coding solution while mixed strategy vector of the 
third players indicates optimum switching rate among different network components or membership 
probabilities for optimal soft scheduling approach. Optimum throughput is the value of the proposed 
nonlinear cubic game at equilibrium. The proposed nonlinear cubic game is solved by extending fictitious 
playing method. Numerical and simulation results prove the superior performance of the proposed 
techniques compared to the conventional schemes using hard graph coloring.  
Keywords— Matrix games, graph fractals, soft graph coloring, mixed strategies, network coding, plain 
routing, wireless ad-hoc networks, conflict free scheduling, interference controlling. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Optimization of routing for unicast networks where each source is sending its data to just one sinks, is 
straightforward and many algorithms are already available on the topic [1-5]. Multicasting, which is 
sending data from the source to a group of destinations, provides multicast gain resulting into decreased 
overall required network resources [6-9]. In addition to this inherent gain multicasting provides a chance 
for using network coding gain. Although network coding can be also used in unicasting with multiple 
sessions, its main advantage is for multicasting. Network coding with additional process at relays and 
even source nodes increases the overall throughput. This technique, originally proposed for satellite 
communications, is extended for applications in wired and wireless communications [10-14]. Although 
plain routing and network coding usually are not used together, a combination of these techniques can 
improve the performance [15-17]. When the problem of joint routing and network coding is extended to 
wireless ad-hoc network, interference between links must be controlled through scheduling, because of 
omnidirectional transmissions. Scheduling in wireless communications is modeled as a coloring problem 
in graph theory where two adjacent areas (sub graphs) cannot be painted with the same color [18-23]. 
Therefore the problem of routing and network coding should be solved simultaneously with scheduling 
[24-27].  
In this paper a nonlinear cubic game is proposed to jointly optimize routing, network coding, multicast 
gain and scheduling. This new approach optimizes scheduling by introducing concept of soft coloring 
where any link can be painted with more than one distinct color. The proposed technique although needs 
to solve a complex non-linear game, presents the optimal solution for the problem. On the other hand, 
dominancy theory helps us to reduce volume of the cubic payoff matrix.  
To solve this game model we propose an extended fictitious play (FP) technique. In FP players can update 
their belief on other player’s strategies based on history of their decisions. This technique which is used to 
solve matrix games was proposed by Brown [28] and its convergence proved in [29]. FP has originally 
been proposed for ordinary linear games and in this paper we extend its application for the proposed non-
linear cubic game model.  
A. Review of Related Works 
Reference [30] introduces the application of matrix games to find capacity of wired networks with 
network switching and [17] extends its application to optimize joint routing and network coding for wired 
networks. In [30] and [17], presentation of graph is modified to path matrix instead of conventional 
definition by set of nodes and links. Reference [31] uses this problem formulation for joint optimization 
of routing, and network coding in wireless networks and solves it with a heuristic algorithm. For a large 
wireless network, path matrix has excessively large dimensions and application of matrix games helps us 
to simplify and solve joint optimization problem.  
References [32]-[36] are of particular relevance for our work. For this reason in the sequel we will 
explicitly point out the difference between our work and the results presented in these papers.  
Reference [32] discusses network coding games with unicast flows. To implement network coding, users 
need to coordinate and cooperate with respect to their strategies in terms of duplicating and transmitting 
side information across specific parts of the network. In unicast applications where users have no inherent 
interest in providing (or concealing) their information to (or from) any destinations except for their unique 
one, this assumption becomes critical in the face of users’ autonomy. A trivial approach to unicast 
network coding would be for intermediate nodes to perform network coding whenever possible. Via a 
simple generalization of the two user butterfly network, [32] shows that in general this approach is not 
desirable; it not only fails to achieve capacity, but it may also induce a network coding game with 
undesirable equilibria. [32] constructs a network coding scheme for an example that not only achieves 
capacity (implying a Pareto optimal solution), but does so in a dominant strategy sense. In other words, 
the proposed network coding scheme ensures that the desirable capacity achieving solution emerges as a 
dominant strategy equilibrium point of the game.  
Reference [33] also uses a game theoretic framework for studying a restricted form of network coding in a 
general wireless network. The network is fixed and known, and the system performance is measured as 
the number of wireless transmissions required to meet n unicast demands. Game theory is here employed 
as a tool for improving distributed network coding solutions. A framework that allows each unicast 
session to independently adjust his routing decision in response to local information is proposed. The 
unicast sessions are modeled as self-interested decision makers in a noncooperative game. 
This approach involves designing both local cost functions and decision rules for the unicast sessions so 
that the resulting collective behavior achieves a desirable system performance in a shared network 
environment. The performance of the resulting distributed algorithms is compared to the best performance 
that could be found and implemented using a centralized controller. 
The focus is on the performance of stable solutions defined as a form of Nash equilibrium. Results 
include bounds on the best- and worst-case stable solutions as compared to the optimal centralized 
solution. The result show that bounds on the best- and worst-case stable performance cannot be improved 
using cost functions that are independent of the network structure. Results in learning in games prove that 
the best-case stable solution can be learned by self-interested players with probability approaching 1. 
In [34] the contents of network flows are specified through network coding (or plain routing) in network 
layer and the throughput rates are jointly optimized in medium access control layer over fixed set of 
conflict-free transmission schedules (or optimized over transmission probabilities in random access). If 
the network model incorporates bursty sources and allows packet queues to empty, the objective is to 
specify the stability region as the set of maximum throughput rates that can be sustained with finite packet 
delay. Dynamic queue management strategies are used to expand the stability region toward the 
maximum throughput region. Because of the complexity introduced by the presence of multiple sources, 
the requirement of stable operation, and the wireless network properties, [34] restricts its attention to a 
simple tandem network topology with at most two-node connectivity such that any packet transmission 
reaches only its left and right neighbors, respectively which oversimplifies the routing problem.  
In [35] a method is proposed to identify structural properties of multicast network configurations, by 
decomposing networks into regions through which the same information flows. This decomposition 
demonstrates that very different networks are equivalent from a coding point of view, and offers a means 
to identify such equivalence classes. It also allows us to divide the network coding problem into two 
almost independent tasks: one of graph theory and the other of classical channel coding theory. This 
approach to network coding enables us to derive the smallest code alphabet size sufficient to code any 
network configuration with two sources as a function of the number of receivers in the network. [35] 
proposes deterministic algorithms to specify the coding operations at network nodes without the 
knowledge of the overall network topology. Such decentralized designs facilitate the construction of 
codes that can easily accommodate future changes in the network, e.g., addition of receivers and loss of 
links. In our work network topology decomposition is used for scheduling purposes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model for wireless ad-hoc networks 
is presented. The matrix game framework combined with soft graph coloring for optimization of link 
scheduling is presented in Section III. In Section IV, the proposed matrix game model is extended as a 
nonlinear cubic game to jointly optimize routing, network coding, multicast gain and scheduling along 
with extended FP algorithm to solve the proposed nonlinear cubic game is presented. In Section V, 
numerical results are presented and finally paper is concluded in Section VI.  
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND SYSTEM MODEL 
Assume a multi-source wireless ad-hoc network including N nodes. This network is defined as 
),,,,,,(G M21 sssζEV K  where V  is set of nodes with N elements, E  is set of L wireless links, ζ is set 
of M sources and is  is set of sinks corresponding to the ith source. If source is sending unicast data, size 
of its sink set is one. Wireless propagation for this network assumes the following: 
1. Omni-directional transmission.  
2. Presence of interference due to simultaneous transmission. 
3. TDMA as multiple access scheme for different hops without inter time slot interference.  
 
A. Conflict Free Operation 
Assume ijS  as the power, in dB, required at node j, for transmitting node i to reach the receiving node j at 
distance ijd with 
α−
∝ ijiij dSS where α is attenuation factor and iS  is transmission power of ith node.  
By, definition of the conflict free scheduling [37,38], any node k ≠i , j, receiving the signal from node m, 
will be interfered by link ijl  if and only if  mk ikS S β≤ + , where β , in dB,  is acceptable interference 
margin between two links. In other word, link ijl  is adjacent to mkl  for any m and any k ≠i , j if 
.mk ikS S β≤ +  (1) 
Alternatively, the two links are adjacent if 
.βSS mjij +≤  (2) 
Whenever ijl and mkl  are physically adjacent i.e. they have a common node or either (1) or (2) hold, they 
cannot be painted by the same color. Using (1) and (2), link adjacency matrix which is used to design 
network graph coloring algorithm is defined. This type of conflict free transmission needs exact 
knowledge of the distance between any two nodes in the network.  
A simpler definition for conflict free transmission counts distance between links in terms of number of 
hops and usually if distance between two links is more than one hop they are assumed to be  not-adjacent. 
Two links are called k hops-adjacent if there are connected through k-1 links and when two links are 
physically adjacent they are called one hop-adjacent. 
B. Paths Identification 
The next step is to identify the set of all possible paths from each source to its corresponding set of sinks. 
Unicast path identification can be done using any algorithm available in the literature. For instance 
Dijkstra algorithm finds shortest path and it can be easily extended to find n,mI  shortest path from mth 
source to its nth corresponding sink.  
Assume n,miP
 as ith non-cyclic directed path from the mth source to its nth corresponding sink. Set of all 
multicast paths from source m to the set of sinks ms  are calculated as follows, 
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where U is union and | . | is cardinality operator. We also define network coded paths as sets of links to 
carry minimum required systematic and parity data from sources to sinks whereas received packets at 
sinks are decodable. Assume simple butterfly network Fig. 1 where first node is source and last two nodes 
are multicast sinks. We can define 9 multicast paths as follows,  
{ }3613251211,11 llllPP ,,,== , { }4624251212,12 llllPP ,,,== , { }463413251213,13 lllllPP ,,,,== ,
{ }361345241211,24 lllllPP ,,,,== , { }4645241212,25 llllPP ,,,== , { }46341345241212,313,26 llllllPPP ,,,,,=== ,
{ }3645341311,37 llllPP ,,,== , { }4645341313,38 llllPP ,,,== , { }4645363425241312NC9 llllllllPP ,,,,,,,==  
where last path is network coded path and contains all links of butterfly network.  
Next step is compression of the selected paths due to omnidirectional nature of the propagation and 
inherent multicast gain. If one multicast path consists of two or more links carrying the same information 
and originating from the same source, they can be substituted with one equivalent link dependent on the 
definition of the adjacency. If link adjacency is defined based on interference margin, those links are 
replaced with the one with higher power. If k-hops adjacency definition is used, those links are substituted 
with one new link. We refer to this process as topology compression that reduces the network interference 
graph and simplifies the scheduling process. For instance for topology in Fig. 1 and using k-hops 
adjacency definition, 1P , 2P ,…, 9P  are compressed as: 
{ }3625)3,2(11 lllP ,,= , { }46)5,4(2122 lllP ,,= , { }463425)3,2(13 llllP ,,,= , { }364524)3,2(14 llllP ,,,= ,
{ })6,5(424125 lllP ,,= , { }34)6,5(424)3,2(16 llllP ,,,= , { }45)6,4(3137 lllP ,,= , { })6,5(434138 lllP ,,= ,
{ })6,5(4)6,4(3)5,4(213129 lllllP ,,,,= , 
where for instance new link )3,2(1l  means link originating from node 1 and ending at both nodes 3 and 5 
realized with only one transmission. With this notation, the problem of optimum multicast routing is 
finding optimum usage rates for the identified paths. 
 
 
C. Conventional Scheduling: Motivating Example 
   In general conflict free scheduling is based on conventional network graph coloring techniques. When 
conventional graph coloring is used, any link is painted by just one color and no two adjacent links are 
painted with the same color. When all links have the same capacity and they are used with the same rate, 
any minimal conventional coloring is optimum solution for links scheduling. Following simple example 
shows inefficiency of coloring when links must be activated with different usage rates. Assume that we 
have 3 links l1 , l2 , l3 with usage rates r1=3 , r2=1 , r3=2. This means that within a given time frame, 
referred to as clique cycle to be minimized, link l1 is used during 3 time slots (r1=3), link l2 during one slot 
only (r2=1) and link l3 during 2 slots (r3=2). In addition, due to a given link adjacency, link 1 can be 
activated with other two simultaneously and two others cannot be activated together. The minimal 
coloring schemes for these 3 links with their assigned rates are as follows 
i) T1={l1, l2} and T2={l3}  required number of time slots (clique cycle) is 5. 
ii) T1={l1, l3} and T2={l2}  required number of time slots is 4. 
Obviously none of these coloring schemes is optimum and the optimum scheduling for these links is, 
iii) T1={l1, l2} during the first time slot and T2={l1, l3} during the next two slots;  required number of time 
slots is 3. 
Therefore in optimum solution T1 and T2 have non-empty intersection and we call non-overlapped partial 
topologies as components of the topology represented by graph fractals. A topology or network 
component set is a complete set of links that can be activated at the same time. Any single link is also a 
component and we call them as first generation network components and τth generation of network 
components refers to the set of all components with τ members. Network components of each generation 
are parents of the next generation.  For our 3-links example, we have 5 components as follows, T1={l1}, 
T2={l2}, T3={l3}, T4={l1, l2} and T5={l1, l3},  where first 3 components are parents of the last two ones. 
Consequently in general case to optimize the scheduling appropriate network components and their 
optimal usage rates must be found.  
III. MATRIX GAME MODELING FOR OPTIMUM SCHEDULING 
A. Formulation of the Game 
Given link activation rate r and link capacity c vectors with I elements and network component set ζ  
with J elements, we define a payoff matrix H as follows, 
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where ir  and ic  are activation rate and capacity respectively for ith link and  ζ j  is the jth network 
component. Assume H as payoff matrix of the min-max zero sum game between two players where their 
strategy sets are links and network components sets respectively. In the sequel we prove that the mixed 
strategy vector of the second player gives optimum network component rate. 
Theorem 1- mixed equilibrium of the zero sum game defined by payoff matrix (4) gives optimum 
scheduling for usage rate vector r. 
Proof: Assume x and y as mixed strategies of the players at equilibrium. Since y is normalized to 1, 
activation of network components in average needs one time slot. Parameter ir~ as activation rate of ith 
link supported by components of vector y is computed as follows, 
[ ]yHi
i
i
r
r~
=  (5) 
where [ ]Hi  is ith row of the H . Therefore for a given component rate vector y, the link with minimum 
supported rate, which is bottleneck of the game is, 
[ ]( ),i iiimummin yHminarg=  (6) 
Consequently optimum component rate vector must maximize [ ]( )yHiimin  as 
[ ]( ).ii yHy minmax  arg= y  (7) 
And theoretically (7) is equivalent to  
( )Hyxx Txmin arg=
, 
(8) 
( )Hyxy Tymax  arg= , (9) 
where (8) and (9) define equilibrium for game defined by payoff matrix H and value  
( )HyxTxminmax =Value=Throughput y . (10) 
Formulation of the problem as a game gives us the chance to simplify the model using some special 
properties of the games, like dominancy theory. For instance in general case while solving this game, 
because of dominancy, components tagged as parent can be ignored because apparently any parent is 
dominated by its child. Therefore we just need to consider last generation generated (born) from any link. 
In addition, calculation of mixed strategy for linear games is easy and can be performed by fictitious 
playing method (FP).  
B. FP Algorithm to Solve the Proposed Game Model 
FP property of the games is a feature of stationary games where players can update their belief on the 
other player’s strategies based on history of their decisions. This technique which is used to solve matrix 
games, was proposed by Brown [12] and its convergence for different conditions was proved in [13-18]. 
FP algorithm for a min-max zero-sum game has following steps, 
Algorithm 1: FP algorithm for min-max game 
Step 1. Initialization of kxˆ  which is estimated x  at kth iteration as, 
[ ] ,ˆ Ti Hx =0  (11) 
where [ ]Hi  is and arbitrary row of H  ( xˆ  actually will be Hy ). Then set iteration number k=1. 
Step 2. Finding best strategy for the first player at kth iteration as, 
m,kk xˆi 1mmin  arg −=  (12) 
where m,kxˆ  is mth element of the kxˆ .   
Step 3. Updating kyˆ  as, [ ] kikk ˆˆ Hyy += −1 . 
Step 4. Finding best strategy for the second player at kth iteration as, 
n,kk yˆj nmax  arg=  (13) 
where n,kyˆ  is nth element of the kyˆ .   
Step 5. If the algorithm has not δ converged to equilibrium where δ  is an small threshold set 1← +kk  
then update kxˆ  as, 
[ ]Hxx
kjkk ˆˆ += −1 , (14) 
and then return to Step 2. Algorithm is δ converged if, 
δ≤−
kk i,kj,k xˆyˆ , (15) 
When the algorithm approaches equilibrium mixed strategies for both players are calculated as 
probabilities of the strategies taken at all iterations i.e. averaging over ki s and kj s. 
C. Numerical Results for Optimum Scheduling 
We present numerical results for network coded butterfly network shown in Fig. 1. For this network path 
P9 in Section II.B, has 6 links [ ]T),(),(),(),( l,l,l,l,l,l 6546435423211312=L  involved in the path. When 
these links have the same capacity, conventional and optimum scheduling are the same because they also 
have the same link usage rate. Therefore we present the result for the case when links have different 
capacities.  Assume C as vector of link capacity rates as, 
[ ]T. , . , . , . , . , . 632504644110351791607916028441=C , (16) 
where capacity of )3,2(1l  is minimum capacity of 12l and 13l . Adjacency matrix for these 6 links is, 
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based on adjacency matrix A , 11 network components are defined where first 6 are single link parents 
and dominated by the last 5. Dominating components are as follows, 
C1={l12 , l3(4,6)}, C2={l12 , l4(5,6)},  C3={l13 , l2(4,5)}, C4={l13 , l4(5,6)}, C5={l1(2,3) , l4(5,6)}. 
After solving the defined game using (8)-(9) and running FP with 2000 iterations, x and y at equilibrium 
have values as follows, 
[ ]T0.0193  ,  0.0099  ,  0.0121  , 0.3671  ,  0.3671  ,  0.2245=x , (18) 
[ ]T0.3823  ,  0.0875  ,  0.2942  ,  0.0104  ,  0.2256=y . (19) 
Fig. 2 presents transient behaviour of the FP where black and blue curves are payoff received by the first 
and second players respectively. We can see the payoff received by the second player faces a sharp peak 
at initial iteration but this peak is disappeared after a few iteration and both payoffs are converged to the 
same value. On the other hand, as we are expecting payoff received by the second player is always more 
than one received by the first player. At equilibrium both payoffs approach value of the game which is 
throughput equal to 0.61 packet/time slot. At the same time for  a conventional scheduling with following 
3 partial topologies, T1={l12 , l3(4,6)}, T2={l13 , l2(4,5)}, T3={l4(5,6)}, the achieved throughput is 0.55 
packet/time slot. The throughput gain of the proposed optimum scheduling compared to the conventional 
one is about 11 percent. 
IV. MATRIX GAME MODELING FOR JOINT OPTIMUM ROUTING, NETWORK CODING AND 
SCHEDULING 
A. Formulation of the Game 
Assume z as vector of path usage rates in the problem of multipath routing. In this case, we modify the 
proposed game model in Section III by adding a third player with mixed strategy vector z. Clearly, link 
usage rates are linear combinations of path usage rates and therefore according to (4), the proposed 3 
player game will be defined by modifying parameter ir  in (4) by a linear combination of elements of 
vector z. Consequently, the proposed game in general form becomes nonlinear cubic game where strategy 
sets of its players are links, paths, and network components respectively and the actual payoff and cost 
received by the first and third players respectively is a nonlinear function of mixed strategy chosen by the 
second player. According to (4), for a given z, if the first and the second players choose their ith and jth 
pure strategy, their payoff and cost will be 
1
1/ K ijk kk a z=∑ , where ijka  as elements of 3 dimensional (cubic) 
matrix is defined as follows, 









∉∞
=
Otherwise.0
if,
path,codednetworkcompressedaisand∈∈if1
path,multicastcompressedaisand∈∈if1
,
,Pl
Pl,Pl,
C
Pl,Pl,
a
ji
jqiji
c
jqiji
ijq
κ
κ
 (20) 
and cC is the number of XOR combined links at the node with network coding. For our general problem 
of joint optimal modeling of the routing, scheduling, and network coding using game theory, set of payoff 
matrices introduced in the Section III are replaced by the same number of matrices (this time 3 
dimensional) with elements ijka . The mixed strategies and value of this game are calculated as follows, 
,
za
yx
arg
L
1i
J
1j
K
1k
kijk
ji
x ∑∑
∑
= =
=
min=x  (21) 
,
za
yx
arg
L
1i
J
1j
K
1k
kijk
ji
y ∑∑
∑
= =
=
max=y
 
(22) 
,
za
yxL
1i
J
1j
K
1k
kijk
ji
z ∑∑
∑
= =
=
maxarg=z
 
(23) 
Throughput=Value= ∑∑
∑
= =
=
maxmaxmin
L
1i
J
1j
J
1j
kijk
ji
zyx
za
yx
. (24) 
Since the value of this game is a linear function of mixed strategy vector of the first and second player, 
dominancy theory is still applicable for their strategies but this property of linear games is not valid for 
the third player’s strategies. 
Theorem 2- Dominancy theory for the first two players, in the proposed nonlinear cubic game: Strategy 1i  
of the first player is dominated by its strategy 2i  if for any j and k, jkijki 21 aa ≤  and in the same way, 
strategy 1j  of the second player is dominated by its strategy 2j  if for any i and k, kijkij 21 aa ≥ . 
Proof- We only need to prove the first part of the theorem and the second part is proved in the same way. 
Assume x, y, and z as strategy vectors at equilibrium. If jkijki 21 aa ≤  for any j and k, therefore 
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and, 
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(26) 
Therefore the payoff received by the first player is less than or equal to the value of the game if the player 
chooses strategy 2i  instead of 1i  and consequently 1i  strategy is dominated by 2i . Inequality is possible 
iff 0
1
=ix .              
B. Extended Fictitious Playing for Nonlinear Cubic Game (20-22)  
To solve (21)-(23), we first prove that against any mixed strategies of the second and third players, the 
best option of the first player is a pure strategy. 
Theorem 3- For given mixed strategy vectors y and z, first player receives minimum payoff by a pure 
strategy and for given mixed strategy vectors x and z, second player receives maximum payoff by a pure 
strategy. 
Proof- Assume, ∑
∑
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=
minarg=
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j
imin
za
y
i . Consequently we have 
∑ ∑
∑
∑∑
∑
∑∑
∑
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
L
i
J
j
K
k
kjki
j
i
L
i
J
j
K
k
kjki
jiL
i
J
j
K
k
kijk
ji
za
y
x
za
yx
za
yx
maxmax
= =
=
= =
=
= =
=
=≥ . (27) 
Considering ∑
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I
1i
i 1x , right hand side of (27) is simplified as,  
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i.e. payoff received by the first player when it chooses mini th strategy is minimum and proof is complete. 

 
The second part of the theorem for the second player is proved in the same way but there is no such a 
property for the third player and consequently conventional FP algorithm can not be used for the third 
player.  
Algorithm 2: Extending Fictitious Playing Algorithm for nonlinear cubic game (21-23). 
Step 1. Initialization of y , z as follows, 
[ ] and1and2∈∀for00 1 ,yJ,j,y,q )q()q(j === [ ] .zandK,kfor,z )q()q(k 12∈∀0 1 ==  
Step 2. Setting iteration number q←q+1 and calculation of the payoff received by different strategies of 
the first player as, 
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Step 3. Choosing best strategy for the first player against y(q) and z(q)  as, 
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Step 5. Calculation of the payoff received by different strategies of the second player as, 
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Step 6. Choosing best strategy for the second player against x(q) and z(q)  as, 
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Step 7. Updating y(q)  as ))q(max
)q(
j
)q(
j
)q(
j
)q(
j´ jjforyyandyy )q(max)q(max ≠∀←+←
−− 11 1 .  
Step 8. Updating z(q)  using following iterative algorithm which is based on steepest descent algorithm. 
(Notice, value of the game is a non-linear function of z and consequently best strategy of the third player 
at iteration q can not be found by just maximization over strategy set of this player.) 
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(34) 
where µ  is  step size. 
8.3. Assuming ρ  as minimum of  k,tz~  versus k, k,tz  is updated as,  
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8.4. ,tt 1← +  and return to 8.2 for the next iteration. 
 
This sub-algorithm is repeated until have 
convergence. 
 
Step 9. Updating z(q) as .)q(t
)q()q( zzz += −1  
Step 10. Going to step 2, and repeating steps 2-9 to have convergence.  
Step 11. After Q iterations when convergence condition holds calculated mixed strategy vector are 
normalized to one as )Q(
)Q(
)eq(
x
x
x = , )Q(
)Q(
)eq(
y
y
y = , and )Q(
)Q(
)eq(
z
z
z = . This normalization during 
iterations before convergence is not necessary and can be performed only once after convergence. 
C. Numerical Results for Nonlinear Cubic Game 
For numerical results, we consider the same scenario as in Section III, i.e. butterfly network shown in 
Fig. 1, with 8 paths defined in Section II and link capacities and network components set defined in 
Section III. We solve this joint optimization and routing problem using the proposed FP algorithm for 
non-linear cubic game. For 1-hop adjacency, Paths 4, 5, 6, and 8 are dominated by other 5 paths and 
therefore we actually need to find rates for 4 remained paths. Fig. 3 shows transient behavior of the 
payoffs received by 3 players. It can be seen that, for lower iteration index, payoff received by the 
third player has a sharp peak. Although this peak disappears for higher iteration indices, but it can be 
avoided by better initialization in the steepest descent algorithm proposed to update mixed strategy of 
the 3rd player. As we are expecting although payoff received by the first player is always less than 
ones received by its opponents but all payoff asymptotically converge to the same value. Mixed 
strategies of 3 players at equilibrium are, 
[ ]T0.4733  ,  0.2245  ,  0.2928  , 0.0015  ,  0.0055  , 0.0025=x , (36) 
[ ]T0.7839  ,  0.0625  ,  0  ,  0.0510  ,  0.1025=y , (37) 
[ ]T0.2394  ,  0.2289  ,  0.3003  ,  0.0030  ,  0.2284=z . (38) 
The value of the game which is equivalent to the throughput is 0.76 which show about 25 percent gain 
compared to single path routing with optimum scheduling and 36 percent gain compared to single path 
routing with conventional scheduling. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
Simulation results are presented in two different parts for multiple single-path (unicast) and single source 
multipath (multicast) routing scenarios respectively. The first part presents simulation results for optimum 
scheduler presented in Section III and second part presents simulation results for joint routing and 
scheduling algorithm presented in Section IV. For both parts, network graphs are generated randomly 
with nodes uniformly distributed over unit square and Monte Carlo simulation technique is used. 
A. Simulation Results for Multiple Single-Path Unicast Sessions 
Game model proposed in Section III with random selection of sources and their corresponding sinks is 
used. For each source-sink pair shortest path (physically shortest part that requires minimum power) is 
calculated using Dijkstra algorithm [37]. Attenuation factor α is assumed to be 4 and number of packets to 
deliver from each source to its corresponding sink is randomly chosen by Poisson distribution.   
The proposed optimal algorithm is compared to the conventional scheduling based on network graph hard 
coloring. The average number of required time slots to carry each packet from source to its corresponding 
sink is considered as performance criterion. This parameter is reciprocal of the value of the game 
calculated by (10) (throughput). Results are averaged over 1000 independent runs. At each run, link usage 
rate is calculated from load on each path and then using (1) and (2) adjacency matrix is defined. Finally 
using (4) game model is defined and it is solved using FP algorithm presented in Section III. Results are 
summarized in Figs. 4-5. 
Fig. 4, presents average number of required time slots (inverse to the system throughput) versus number 
of parallel unicast source-sink pairs (different numbers of source-sink sessions) when N =10 nodes.  We 
can see from the figure that the proposed scheduling outperforms the conventional scheme. In the case of 
higher number of source-sink sessions, optimum scheduling offers more gain because when higher 
number of paths is participating in the scheduling process there are more chances that soft coloring will 
find the combination that is more efficient than the hard coloring. In other words every link has more 
potential partners for simultaneous transmission, the number of last generation of components is higher 
and consequently scheduling gain is also higher. In this case, the proposed optimum scheduling needs 
between 11 and 25 percent less time slots in average.  
 Fig. 5, presents the same results for N=20. In this case, we can see that the scheduling gain compared to 
conventional scheduler is even higher than in Fig. 4. 
B. Simulation Results for Optimization of Multicast Routing and Scheduling 
In this part, nonlinear cubic game model presented in Section IV, is simulated over randomly generated 
graphs with uniformly distributed nodes for the cases N=20 up to N=200 nodes, and number of sinks 
between 1 to 6 . Results are averaged over 100 independent runs. In each run, one node is randomly 
selected as source and some of other nodes are selected as its corresponding sinks. Then using a modified 
version of Dijkstra algorithm up to 4 shortest paths from source to each sink are identified and then by 
combining the identified unicast path using (3) set of multicast paths are constructed. In the next step, 
wireless links involved in the set of multicast paths are identified and then their adjacency matrix is 
defined using (1) and (2). Finally the non-linear cubic game is defined using (20) and solved by using 
modified FP algorithm presented in Section IV.B and the throughput is calculated using (24).  Simulation 
results are presented for both NC coded and non coded cases combined with both conventional and 
optimum scheduling and compared with corresponding results for single path case with conventional and 
optimum scheduling presented in Section III. To decrease the complexity especially for large network 
sizes where the number of multicast paths exponentially increases we have limited the number of 
multicast paths to 10 i.e. 10 lowest power path are selected. This simplification does not affect the 
performance because as we expect at equilibrium just a few the best paths are picked up and coefficient 
for high power path is always zero. 
Fig. 6 presents simulation results for 5 multicast receivers while the interference margin β=5dB. It can be 
seen that for all of network sizes, optimized multipath routing outperforms single path case and this 
improvement when network coding is used is even high. Throughput gain resulting from using network 
coding in multipath routing is up to 9 percent while for single path routing scheme this gain is negligible. 
In both NC coded and non coded cases, proposed optimum scheduling improves throughput up to 15.8 
percent for a large network. On can see form Fig. 6 that when there are 5 sinks, the overall joint 
optimization of routing, scheduling, and network coding improves the throughput up to 55 percent. 
Fig. 7 presents the same results for N=100 nodes versus the number of multicast receivers. As we expect 
multicast throughput decreases with increasing number of multicast receivers but the total throughput 
received by all receivers increases. Throughput gain achieved by NC increases with increasing number of 
multicast sinks (multipath routing).  
Fig. 8 presents throughput per normalized power for N=100 nodes versus number of multicast receivers to 
demonstrate that throughput improvement observed in Figs. 7 and 8 does not cost more power 
consumption. In this case power has been normalized with respect to the dimensions of the environment. 
In this figure we observe the same behavior for different curves as in Fig. 7.  In this case the improvement 
in throughput per power when there are 6 multicast receivers is 57 percent which is even a bit more than 
throughput gain in Fig.7.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper novel techniques based on matrix games are proposed to solve joint optimal multipath 
routing and scheduling problem in wireless ad-hoc network. In the first proposed technique soft 
scheduling is modeled by matrix games. To define the game model, wireless topology is first partitioned 
into networks components, represented by graph fractals, which are actually overlapped partial 
topologies. Then by assigning appropriate usage rates to the selected network components optimum 
scheduling is achieved. The optimal rates for graph fractals are obtained by calculating mix equilibrium of 
a matrix game between links and network components. Using matrix games, in this case, helps us to 
simplify the problem by applying dominancy theory and fictitious playing method, which works 
iteratively, provides quick convergence.  
The proposed optimum scheduling is extended to joint optimum multipath routing and scheduling by 
adding a third player to the scheduling game. Mixed strategy of this new player at equilibrium optimizes 
rates assigned to each path. The value of the proposed game is a non-linear function of mixed strategy of 
the third player and we call this game nonlinear cubic game. Because of non-linearity, the proposed game 
model cannot be solved using conventional FP algorithm and therefore we present an efficient modified 
FP algorithm to solve this problem. Simulation results prove the efficiency of the proposed game models. 
Using this joint optimization throughput and throughput per power improve up to 55 and 57 percents 
respectively compared to conventional solutions.  
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Fig. 1. Typical butterfly network with network coding. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Payoff received by two players w.r.t. iteration number when scheduling in single path butterfly 
optimized. 
  
Fig. 3. Payoff received by 3 players w.r.t. iteration number from non-linear cubic game when joint 
routing and scheduling in multipath butterfly network is optimized. 
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Fig. 4. Average no. of required time slots w.r.t. number of source-sink pairs for N=10. 
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Fig. 5. Average no. of required time slots w.r.t. number of source-sink pairs for N=20. 
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Fig. 6. Multicast throughput of the optimized multipath and single-path routing for both conventional and 
optimum scheduling with and without network coding w.r.t. number of nodes in the networks while 
β=5dB and there are 5 multicast sinks.  
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Fig. 7. Multicast throughput of the optimized multipath and single-path routing for both conventional and 
optimum scheduling with and without network coding w.r.t. number of nodes in the networks while 
β=5dB and there are 100 nodes in the network. 
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Fig. 8. Multicast throughput per normalized power of the optimized multipath and single-path routing for 
both conventional and optimum scheduling with and without network coding w.r.t. number of nodes in 
the networks while β=5dB and there are 100 nodes in the network. 
 
 
